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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM B. MASON,
Plaintiff wnd Respondent,
vs.

\VAYNE N. ~fASON,
Defendant and Appella.nt.

APPELI_jANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF F'ACTS
rrhe following facts are admitted by both parties:
The government of the United States was the owner of
a single unit of land located near the foothills of th0
Wasatch Range near Plymouth, Box Elder County, lltah
'vhi'Ch was composed of thirteen subdivisions aggregating 540.16 acres. Under the authority of Section 2-l-55
of the Revised Statutes, as arnended ( 43 USC, 1946 Ed.
Supp. 4, Section 1171) the government offered this land
for public sale. The sale was held on September 28,
1949 and defendant purchased the entire tract. Within
the time allowed by law, plaintiff who clairned to be the
O\Vner of contiguous lands, and defendant, vvho also
claimed to he the owner of contiguous lands, hoth a~sPrtSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ed p·referential right to purchase this isolated tract. As
the preference right claimants, plaintiff and defendant
failing to agree respecting the division of the isolated
tract between them, the matter· was referred to the
regional administrator of the Colorado-Utah· region,
Bureau of Land 1\{anagement. On April 10, 1950 he determined that defendant should he permitted to purchase
the one subdivision (the Southeast Quarter, Northwest
Quarter of Section 35, Township 14 North, Range 3 West,
Salt Lake ~Ieridian) of the isolated tract to which his
privately owned land· is contiguous and that plaintiff
should be permitted to purchase the twelve other subdivisions of the isolated tract. Upon the basis of the
region administrator's determination, the manager of the
land and survey office at Salt Lake City, on April 13,
1950, issued a formal decision apportioning the isolated
tract between the preference rights claimants in the
twelve and one manner indicated by the regional administrator. Both of the preference rights claimants thereupon took appeals to the director of the Bureau of Land
Management. Plaintiff contended that the entire isolated
tract should have been apportioned to him. Defendant
contended that at least one l1alf of the isolated tract
should have been apportioned to him. On September 12,
1950 the assistant director of the Bureau of Land Managen•ent affir1ned the apportionment of the tract previously made by the manager pursuant to the regional
administrator's determination. Defendant then appealed
to the S·ecretary of the Interior. Plaintiff did not take a
further app~eal, although he was served with a copy of
defendant's appeal, and he filed no response thereto.
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On April 2, 1952, the Secretary of the Interior, by
Masten G. White, Solicitor, handed down a decision
reversing the two previous decisions and holding that
under Section 2455 of the revised statutes as amended,
the isola ted tract should be divided between the respective parties on the following basis: Six of said subdivisions to defendant and seven to plaintiff and pursuant
thereto, the United States, on the 5th day of De'Cember,
1952, issued its patent to the defendant to the six subdivisions described as Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and the Southeast
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35, all in
'l1 o\vnship 14 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
and like,vise, issued a patent to the plaintiff to the reInaining seven subdivisions of the isolated tract. No
appeal or writ of review of any kind was taken by plaintiff to review the decision of the Secretary of the Interior.
In support of the foregoing facts, see Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 10; Defendant's Exhibit No. 8 and Findings numbered 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The court by its Conclusion of
Law No. 1, found that both plaintiff and defendant held
preferential rights to purchase the isolated tra~cts offered
by the government under the provisions of Section 2455,
Revised Statutes, as an1ended, (43 USCA, 1171).
Notwithstanding the decision entered by the Department of the Interior, the court proceeded to take evirlenre
for the purpose apparently of determining whether or
not the decision of the Secretary of the lnterior should be
affirmed and after the hearing, upon the evidence subn1itted by both sides, the trial court, in its Finding No.
8, found fro1n the evidence presented in court that it was
not Pquitable within the 1nean1ng of thP statute, (-t-:1
3
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USC, 1201), to apportion, rmder the facts of this case,
the lands to be sold on an equal basis and the trial court
determined that an equitable division would require the
awarding to p~ain tiff all of the en tire tract, except only
Lots 4 and 5, and the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 35. See Finding No. 8. And as a conclusion of law, the court found that the D·epartment of
Interior erroneously interpreted the statute and the
court thereupon found as a Conclusion of Law that the
defendant holds in trust for the plaintiff three of the
Forty-acre tracts which should have been equitably allocate·d and awarded to plaintiff. See Conclusions of Law
No. 2 and No. 4. The court thereupon entered its decree
in equity ordering the defendant, upon being reimbursed
for the costs of the lands in question, to convey to the
plaintiff the additional tracts of land.
The result arrived at then is as follows: Out of the
thirteen original isolated tracts, the S.ecretary of the Interior awarded plaintiff seven. Of the six remaining,
the court awarded plaintiff· three more, which in effect
gave plaintiff ten of the isolated forty-acre tracts and
the defendant three. The defendant appeals from this
decision, con tending that this decision, under the facts
and the law, is erroneous and that the defendant should
be entitled to be decreed the six isolated tracts which
were awarded to him by the Secretary of the Interior.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point 1.
this ease1

Did the District Court have jurisdiction in

4
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Point 2.

If a District Court does have jurisdiction,

\vha.t is the scope of the review?
Point 3. In any event, a court should not set aside
a decision of the Department of Interior, unless it appears frorn the record made on appeal to the Departrnent of the Inte·rior that said department either:
A. Committed an abuse of discretion; or
B.

~Tisinterpreted

and misconstrued the law.

Point 4. That the evidence presented in this case
does not support the Findings, Conclusion of Law and
Decree that the defendant holds title in trust to the three
isolated tracts of land.
We shall discuss these questions in the order suggested in the foregoing statement of points:
ARGUMENT
J>oint 1. DID THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE? As heretofore noted,
the plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Department of the Interior. On the contrary, he stood idly
by until after the patent to the tracts in question had been
issued by the government and then he corn1nenced thi8
suit in the District Court seeking to irnpress a trust upon
this property. It n1akes little difference what you call
this proceeding. After all, it is in the nature of an appeal
from the decision of the Secretary of the Interior on matters relating to public lands; or, if it is not an appeal,
it is an atteu1pted collateral attack on the final decision
of the land deparhnent. I know of no federal statute

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which vests in state 'courts jurisdiction to hear or deterrnine ap.peals from the ·decision o'f the Dep,artment of the
Interior. I recognize that there are cases which hold that
where a citizen goes upon the -public domain, takes possession of the property, puts improvements thereupon
and thereby obtains an equitable interest in the property
that an action may lie in the state court to impress the
property with a trust. In this case, however, plaintiff was
never in possession of the property. He placed no improvements thereon and the question presented to the
Department of the Interior was how to divide the isolated
tract equitably between two contiguous land owners.
The Secretary of the Interior made that division as he
was required to do under the law and we contend that
having made such a decision in the absence of fraud, and
in the absence of an appeal through the proper channels
to the p·rop·er court, that the decision of the Secretary
of the Interior is final and binding upon the court.
We think the following ·cases support our position:
Maddox vs. Burnham, 156 U.S. 544;
Sanders vs. Dutcher, Cal. 187 Pac. 51-187 Pac. 51
Davis vs. F·en, 211 Pac·. 30;
U. S. vs. Mcintosh, Utah, 85 Fed. 333;
Martin vs. Bartmus~ Cal. 207 Pac. 550.
A·ppellant filed a Inotion to dismiss the complaint.
Ail of the matters are sufficiently covered by the allegations of the complaint, to which are attached the various exhibits including the decision of the Department of
Interior, so that the n1atter was squarely presented to the
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court. Objections were also raised to the introduction
of evidence so that the issue is squarely presented to this
court as to whether or not, under the facts alleged, this
complaint stated a cause of action or whether or not the
District Court had jurisdiction to review the decision
as rendered, which in effect is what the plaintiff was
asking the court to do.
Point 2. IF THE DIS.TRICT COURT DO·ES
HAVE JURISDICTION, WHAT IS THE sc·o·PE OF
THE REVIEW~ If the court did have jurisdiction to
hear this matter, and if the complaint does state a cause
of action, then the next question to be determined is this :
What was the scope of the inquiry which could be made
by the District Court~ We contend that the only question
which the District Court 'could determine was whether
or not on the record which was filed with the Department
of the Interior, the rulirng of the Department of the In.terior was erroneous. We quote from the decision:
"The record in this case does not reveal any persuasive reason for departing from the ordinary
rule of apportioning subdivisions among preference right claimants on the basis of equality as far
as possible."
Further on we again quote from the decision wherein it
discusses the evidence ;vhich was presented at the various hearings :
"There was no indication in the determination,
however, regarding the relationship between the
apportionment provided for in it and the nature
of the isolated tract or the use each api)licant
makes of his own lands together with the land
7
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in the isolated tract; and the record does not contain any ~upplementary reports or other written
data tend1ng to explain why these particular factors were regarded as sufficient to warrant a
departure i~ the. present case from the ordinary
rule pres'cr1bed 1n 43 CFR 250.11 (h) (3)."
1

rl he decision then proceeds to analyze the other factor

as revealed by the record with regard to the difference
in the amount of land owned by plaintiff and defendant
and the decision then says:
"However, the fact that William B. Mason owns a
substantially greater acreage of contigious land
than Wayne N. Mason does not, ipso facto, take
this case outside the ordinary rule of equal apportionment as far as possible * * * In this coooection, it is to be noted that neither section 2455
of the Revised Statutes nor the pertinent d'epa,rtJnental regula.tion ntentions the degree of contiguity as a factor affectin.Q the apportionment of
an isolated tract arnong competing preference
right claimants."
In the trial of this case before the District Court,
the plaintiff, over the objection of the defendant, was
per1nitted to testify at so1ne length as to matters which
were clearlr outside the record as presented to the Department of Interior and he attempted to supply evideneP 'vhich \vas clearly absent from the record presented
to the Department of Interior. As we understand it.
the scope of the inquiry contended for by plaintiff is a
judicial detern1ination of whether or not the- Secretary
of the Interior 1nisconstrued the fa'Cts and 1nade an erroneous division of the tract. It is difficult for us to
underHtand how the court could receive and consider
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evidence which was never presented to the Department
of the Interior in an atte·mpt to prove that the Depart-ment of the Interior erroneously construed facts which
were never presented to him. We contend, therefore,
that if the court did have jurisdiction and if the complaint does state a cause of action, yet the court in examining the matter should he limited to considering the
record as actually presented to the Department of the
Interior and not be permitted to offer evidence beyond
the record when the scope of the inquiry is limited to the
question of whether or not the D·epartment of Interior
misconceived the facts as presented to him.
Point 3. IN ANY EVENT, A COURT S.HOULD
NOT ·sET ASIDE A DE·CISION ·OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, UNLESS IT APPEARS FROM
THE RECORD MADE ON APPEAL TO THE DE.PARTMENT O·F THE IN·TERIOR THAT SAID DEp ART1\iENT EITHER:
A.

COMMITTED AN ABUS.E OF' DISCRETION;

OR
B. MISINTERPRETED AND MISC·ONSTRUED
THE LAW.
It is universally held that,
"In case of contest the finding of fact hy the ConlInission of Inspector examined on final appeal by
the Se'Cretary of the Interior are binding upon the
courts in the absence of gross mistake or fraud
and the judicial inquiry is limited to determining
whethe-r it is clear error of law that resulted in
awarding the right of purchase and ultimately
issuing the patent to the wrong party.''
9
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Johnson vs. Riddle, 240 U.S. 467;
United States vs. Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints, 101 F'. 2nd, 156;
Ruberoid Company vs. F·ederal Trade Coinmission, 96 Law Edition 73'2 ·

'

'

Script Howard Radio, Inc., vs. Federal CoinInunieations Comm., 316 U.S. 4;

J a1nieson vs. James, 100 Pac. 700;
Friedman vs. Schwellenback, U.S. Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia;
United States vs. Federal Maritime Board
96 Law Ed., 390.

Tt is also established that,
~'long

continued administrative interpretations of
law is entitled to great weight."
Amirikon vs. United States, U.S.. District Ct.
of ~1aryland, 100 F. Suppl. 2~3.
In the opinion and order of the Secretary of the
Interior, we find the following:
The basic depart1nental policy expressed in the
~eeond sentence of this portion of the regulation
is that the subdivisions included in an isolated
tra.·ct a.re ordinarily to be divided equally among
co1np·eting preference right claiinants, if this is
possible in vie"\\r of the nu1nber of subdivisions
and the nun1ber of such clai1nants; and that where
an equal apportionn1ent cannot be accompHshed
bee a use of an odd nu1nber of subdivisions in relation to the nu1nber of preference right ·claimants,
the apportion1uen t shall be as close as possible to
the ~tnndard of equalit~T."
H
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In other words, at the time that this decision was rendered on April 2, 1952, the policy of the Dep·artment of Interior for a long time previous thereto had been to ap·portion the isolated tracts equally if possible between abutting owners. That policy was followed in this case and
the odd tract was given to the p·laintiff because he initiated the claim to a preferential right at the time this
de·cision was made. See,
.245 Revised Statutes, as amended.

"It shall be lawful for the Secretary of the Interior to order into market and to sell at public
auction any isolated or disconnected tract or parcel of the public domain, not exceeding 1520 acres,
which in his judgment it would be proper to expose for sale, provided that for a period of not
less than thirty days· after the highest bid has
been re·ceived, any owner or owners of contiguous
land shall have a preference right to buy the offered lands at such highest bid price and where
two or more persons apply to exercise such p·reference right, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to make an equitable division of the land
among such applicants."
It is to be noted that a fair degree of discretion is vested
in the Secretary of the Interior in first ordering the
land to be sold and secondly in making a division of the
land among owners of contiguous land. At the time of
this decision, the foregoing statutory provision was
implemented by the following relevant portion of 43
CFR 250.11 (b) (3):
"Where there is a conflict between two or more
persons claiming a pTeference right of purchase,
they will be allowed thirty days from receipt of
11
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-notice· within which to agree an1ong theu1selvt.l~
upon a division of the tracts in conflict by subdivisions. In the absence of an agreement the
regional administrator will1nake a determination
equitably apportioning the various subdivisions
a1nong the claimants, ordinarily so as to equalize
as nearly as possible the tracts they sho~dd be
be permitted to purchase. * * *"

It seems to us that the foregoing language can mean
nothing else except that in 'Case of two or more claimants
desiring to p:urchase it was the declared policy of the
department to divide equally as nearly as possible the
tracts of land each should be p~ermitted to purchase, irrespective of the amount of land each contiguous owner
might own in his own right.
Counsel relies upon Title 43, Chapter 1, Sec. 250.11
(b) (3) as now amended. This was amended on June 4,
1953, n1ore than a year after the decision in question was
rendered. As now a1nended, the foregoing statute adds
the follo\ving pertinent provisions:
"In the absence of an agreement, an equitable
division of the land will be 1nade, taking into consideration such factors as:
., 1. The equalizing of the number of acres
which each claimant will be permitted to
p:urchase,
"2. Desirable land use based on topography
land pattern location of water and similar factors ; and

"3. Legitimate historical use including construction and maintenance of authorized
in1 prove men ts,

12
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if considerations dictate all o'f the subdivisions
may be awarded to one of the claimants.''
It is well established that a subsequent law passed after
the rights had accrued and the legal title had passed is
not op·erative to divest such legal or enlarge as against
such title any equitable rights which the defendant thereafter had.
Maddox vs. Burnham, 156 U.S.. 544.
This question must be decided on the law as it existe~d
at the time of the decision supplemented by rules of interpretation adopted by the department and in long use.
The key words governing the duty of the department as
defined in the act itself are:
''equitably apportioning and to equalize as nearly as possible the tracts."
The word "equitably" has been defined to mean fairly,
justly and impartially. See,
Words and Phrases, Vol. 15, Pages 3, 4, and 5,
and cases cited.
The key word in the statute "equalize" as defined in,
Words and Phrases, Vol. 14A, Page 439.
is as follows:
"To make equal. To ·cause to correspond or be like
in amount or degree as compared with something."
See the following cases:
Los Angeles County vs. Ransohoff, 74 P. 2nd, 828
DeMille vs. Los Angeles County, 77 P. 2nd, 905;
Wells F·argo and Comp·any vs. State Boa.rd, 56
Cal. 194.
It would seen1, therefore, that the duty imposed upon

13
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the depart1uent w·as to divide these tracts equally runong
the preference claimants in a manner that was fair, just
and in1partial but leaving the procedure in affecting this
equitable settlement to the discretion of the departlnent.
It is further noted that in the opinion of the department
it is stated that it is the basic policy of the department
\vhich is being ·carried out. From this it would seem to
be an interpretation of the statute of long standing. If
such is true, if the courts have any right at all, they
should be very careful in substituting their o'vn interpretation of the statute for that of the administrative agency.
See,
Amirikon vs. United States, U.S. District Court of
Maryland, 100 F·. Suppl. 263;
Peck vs. Greyhound Corporation, 93 F. 'Suppl. 679.
We say, therefore, that the apportionment as made by
the department 'vas both fair and equitable in light of the
interpretation and policy adopted by the department
under the statute.
Point 4. THAT ·THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
IN THIS CASE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS., CON·CLUSION OF. LAW AND DEC·REE THAT
TI-IE DE:B-,·ENDANT HOijDS TITLE IN TRUST TO
THE ~PHREE ISOLATED TR.ACTS OF' LAND. Finall~T' \\re eon tend that even though the court was right in
per1nitting the plaintiff to introduce evidence concerning
the Inatters covered by the festi1nony, yet under this evidence the decision of the lower eourt is manifestly erroneous. \V e contend first that the number of acres
owned by each contiguous owner is of no importance
whatsoever. The whole policy of the homestead law from
14
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its inception was to. provide a method whereby citizens
could acquire land on the public domain. It was never
the policy to prefer or even encourage the acquisition of
large tracts of land by one person. If the number of acres
owned by each is controlling, then the bigger the company's or individual holdings would determine his or its
rights to gobble up the public domain and squeeze the
little fellow out completely. The evidence in this case
shows that some years ago the defendant filed a homestead on this land and it was his bona fide intention to
ho1nestead the san1e. l-Ie erected fences within the area.
In addition to this the defendant has the right to graze
twenty seven head of cattle on the national forest. These
isolated tracts adjoin this national forest and the isolated tracts are valuable for early Spring and late :B..,all
grazing before cattle can be turned on the national forest.
The plaintiff owns no rights whatsoever in the national
forest. The defendant has for many years leased Section
36 from the ·state of Utah and the State of Utah has now
announced that it intended to offer this section of land
for sale. Defendant will thereby be given an option equal
to that of plaintiff to purchase this section which adjoins
the national forest on the south and the isolated tracts on
the east. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. It is difficult for us
to see how it can be contended that the awarding to plaintiff of ten of said tracts and the awarding to defendant
of only three tracts can be said to be an equitable apportioninent of the lands or to equalize as nearly as possible
the tracts.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is appellant's contention that the
decision of the Secretary of the Interior apportioning
the land between plaintiff and defendant was strictly
in a'Ccordance with the law, the rules which had been established hy the department and the pTocedure which it
had followed over many years; that the court cannot consider the provisions of the amended act passed in 1953 ;
that the ruling of the dep~artment was fair and just; that
the dep-artment equitably apportioned the land equalizing
it as nearly as possible but gave to the plaintiff the one
extra subdivision; that in doing so the department acted
in good faith; that his decision is supported by the law
as it existed at that time; that the trial court was powerless to reverse, modify· or change this decision; that this
de-cree should be reversed and judgment should be entered dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
Respectfully submitted,

YOUNG, THA·TCHER & GLASMANN,
Attorneys for Appellant

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

